Immanuel pure, that is, void of all

Immanuel Kant’s deduction of judgments amounts to explicating the
faculty of judgments as the unity and presentation of conceptual propositions
and intuitions. To make such a claim, Kant is forced to solve this issue oh how
exactly empirical concepts or propositions share and unite with pure concepts,
a priori concepts in the understanding. 
Kant seems to be addressing the issue that David Hume was unable to
refute, namely, skepticism.  He states,
for example, “Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogenous on
the one hand with the category, and on the hand with the appearance, and which
thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible” (CPR p.181,
Kant).  Clearly then, Kant is interested grounding
and reconciling what the understanding already knows to be true and
confirmation of what we sense to confirmed through a unity.  Kant turns to the concept of time as the
missing link, as he suggests that, “…must be pure, that is, void of all empirical
content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be
intellectual, it must in another sense be sensible.” (CPR p. 181, Kant).  It is a pure a priori concept, like time for
example, which allows sensibility and the categories to communicate.  In other words, it is time understood in the
inner intuition which grounds our sensible data or representations with the
categories deduced by Kant, because time is present in our initial
representation as moments of time.

                It is this
relationship in which I would like to dedicate the remaining space to bring
forth some questions that Kant either assumes or fails to consider.  First, concerning apperception, Kant makes it
apparent that ‘I think’ presupposes our representations, and our
representations presuppose ‘I think’ (Kitcher, P. p.190).  If this is what Kant is arguing, the argument
seems circular and illegitimate. 
Moreover, concerning the deduction of judgements, Kant has not actually
provided any reason for this belief, because it begs the question of which one
comes first?  How can a unity of
representations presuppose the ‘I think and vice versa?  Secondly, he never gives an adequate account
of how these two ideas work together. 
For example, how exactly does the sensible world and information
communicate with structures of the mind. 
If he means that the mind is imposing its structures onto the world,
then that presupposes the mind is primary and essential and a priori, unlike
the sensible world.  I doubt this is
where he wanted to go.  Al though, Kant
does give a critical account the mechanism of how we experience the world, Kant
demonstrates that there may be structures of the mind which was never
considered in detail.